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Abstract. This paper presents a dynamic model to study how different levels of infor-
mation about the root determinants of wealth (luck versus effort) can impact inequality
and intergenerational mobility through societal beliefs, individual choices and redis-
tributive policies. To my knowledge, the model presented is the first dynamic model in
which skills are stochastic and both beliefs and voted redistribution are determined en-
dogenously. The model is able to explain a number of empirical facts. Large empirical
evidence shows that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears
to reflect differences in the social perceptions regarding the determinants of individual
wealth and the underlying sources of income inequality. Moreover the beliefs about
the determinants of wealth impact individual choices of effort and therefore the beliefs
about the determinants of wealth impact inequality and mobility both through choices
of effort and redistributive policies. The model generates multiple equilibria (US ver-
sus Europe-type) which may account for the observed features not only in terms of
societal beliefs and redistribution but also in terms of perceived versus real mobility
and inequality.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a dynamic model to study how different levels of information
about the root determinants of wealth (luck versus effort) can impact inequality and
intergenerational mobility through societal beliefs, individual choices and redistribu-
tive policies. In a companion paper (Gabrieli (2010)), I analyze how different levels of
information about the determinants of individual wealth2 can affect, through individ-
ual beliefs, the individual preferences over redistribution and the individual optimal
decisions of how much effort to exert. As a further step, Gabrieli (2010) analyzes the
impact of incomplete information on the prevailing level of redistribution under major-
ity voting and on aggregate outcomes as aggregate effort, aggregate output and welfare.
The model of Gabrieli (2010) offers policy results in terms of comparative statics and
insights about the various observed differences between laissez-faire versus welfare
state type of economies, but since it describes a one period economy and does not ana-
lyze savings, wealth accumulation or intergenerational transfers, the model cannot say
much about the dynamics of inequality and wealth mobility over time. In this paper I
take the natural further step to study how incomplete information can impact beliefs,
political and economic outcomes in a dynamic set up in order to gain insights about
the dynamics of inequality and wealth mobility. Such exercise seems to be important:
if individual beliefs about the underlying determinants of wealth are important deter-
minants of individual voting and effort choices, then, through those choices, the same
beliefs become important determinants of the dynamics of inequality and mobility.
Another reason is that individual beliefs about the determinants of wealth are intrin-
sically related to individual beliefs about the determinants and the extent of mobility,
which is a dynamic process, it is therefore important to study such beliefs in a dynamic
setting. In order to gain such insights, the present paper introduces the described set
up with varying levels of information in an intergenerational model of bequests with
stochastically evolving skills.
The present model is made of three main building blocks. The first element is a
dynamic set-up with with bequests and stochastic skills which allows to analyze in-
tergenerational inequality and mobility. The second block is given by the political
economy side: a linear redistribution scheme, where the prevailing rate of redistri-
bution is set by the median voter. The third block is the information structure: in
every period the level of information about the true value of individual return on ef-
fort (skills) can vary in a continuous way from a completely uninformative structure
to the case that each individual is perfectly informed about her own skills. The level
of information should be interpreted as an institutional feature of the economy which
governments or other institutions can possibly affect through various policies: edu-
cational policies3, the release of information on past mobility4 or pure propaganda5.
The model is used to conduct two main policy exercises. One exercise consists in ana-
lyzing how different levels of incomplete information affect the endogenous outcomes
(individual voting and effort, redistribution, aggregate effort, output and welfare). An-
other exercise consists in considering also the level of information as endogenous and
analyzing which levels of information are optimal for the society and can arise in an
equilibrium. This paper constitutes a first attempt to link three different strands of
theoretical literature: models of intergenerational inequality, models on the political
economy of redistribution, models which analyze the role of individual and collective
beliefs about the underlying determinants of wealth. A short review of the the related
literature follows.6
(i) Neoclassical models of intergenerational inequality. It is the seminal paper of
Stiglitz (1969) to be commonly considered the first modern analysis of the distribution
of wealth and income among individuals. The model of Stiglitz presents a strong result
of long run convergence in the dynamics of individual income which parallels the sem-
inal result obtained by Solow (1956) in the context of country income. In the model of
Stiglitz agents are endowed with capital (accumulated factor) and labor (non accumu-
lated factor), markets are competitive and both factors are paid at their marginal return.
The assumptions of diminishing returns to capital and of an identical concave saving
function across individuals imply that individual wealth increases over time in a con-
cave fashion and eventually converges to a steady state value which does not depend
on the initial level of wealth. In other words, in the model inequality across fami-
lies is solely determined by the differences in the non accumulated factors (i.e. the
differences in individual skills) and when all families are equally endowed with the
non accumulated factor (i.e. skills are homogenous across families) every family con-
verges to the same level of wealth. Building on this seminal model, other authors have
extended the basic set-up in order to study intergenerational inequality and mobility.
In this context, saving choices have been micro-founded as decisions to leave bequests
for the future generation. For what concerns bequests, two main formalization have
been used in the literature: one in which bequests enter directly into the utility function
of the parents (Atkinson (1980)) and one in which parents care about their children’s
utility per se (Becker and Tomes (1979)). Those two alternative formulations can give
different conclusions about the dynamics of accumulation, inequality and the effects
of redistributive taxation. Developing this type of analysis, Becker and Tomes (1986)
focus on the intergenerational transmission of abilities across generations and study
the implications for the investments in human capital and the resulting dynamics of
inequality.7
More recently there has been extensive work on models with credit market im-
perfections and poverty traps. The basic idea behind the effect of imperfect financial
markets is that if poor individuals are prevented from borrowing and hence cannot
invest, then in a dynamic context initial inequalities may persist and some dynasties
remain stuck into a poverty trap. Therefore these models can produce persistent in-
equality across dynasties abstracting from the effect of skills’ differences. Relevant
papers in this group include those of Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman
(1993), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), among others.
(ii) Models of political economy. The contribution of these models is represented by
the fact that the prevailing level of redistribution is not exogenous but it is the result of
a voting process. This idea has been introduced by the seminal paper of Meltzer and
Richard (1981) and the seminal contributions which introduced it in dynamic macroe-
conomic models are those of Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson
and Tabellini (1994). The main idea behind those models is that, as in Meltzer and
Richard (1981), given the median voter theorem, greater inequality translates into a
poorer median voter relative to the country’s mean income and therefore the greater
the inequality and the higher it is the voted level of redistribution in the economy.
High levels of redistribution in turn lower individual incentives to accumulate capital
and hence the result that inequality lowers growth. In those models inequality derives
from the fact that skills are fixed and persistently different across dynasties. Therefore
such models are focused on the study of the determinants and the implications of redis-
tribution but cannot give insights about the dynamics of mobility. Such models have
been quite influential, especially in bringing endogenous political choices into the big
picture. They also stimulated a great deal of discussion about the relationship between
inequality, growth and redistribution. Some empirical evidence challenged the conclu-
sion on the basis of two different observations.8 The first observation is that it does
not always seem to be the case that inequality is detrimental to growth, even though
the evidence in favor is quite large. The second and major challenge comes from the
observation that it does not seem to be the case that more inequality implies higher re-
distribution. This second challenge inspired a new group of theoretical models whose
major focus is to explain the described evidence relating inequality and redistributive
politics. These models achieve this result showing the existence of multiple equilibria:
a Europe type equilibrium characterized by relatively lower inequality and higher re-
distribution versus a US type equilibrium characterized by relatively higher inequality
and lower redistribution. In the model of Benabou (2000) the prevailing level of redis-
tribution is still a voting outcome, but unlike in the previously mentioned models the
relationship between inequality and redistribution is not monotonic. Other theoretical
models which obtain multiple equilibria with similar features are those of Saint-Paul
(2001) and Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003). Despite the
fact that in the model of Benabou (2000) skills evolve stochastically across genera-
tions, every generation exerts effort before knowing the realization of ability and be-
cause of the same prior on the value of abilities, at each period all individuals exert
the same value of effort. Therefore in the model there are no dynasties which remain
stuck in poverty and the model cannot give insights about the dynamics of mobility.
(iii) Models which focus on the role of beliefs. Starting from the evidence that the
beliefs held by people about the underlying determinants of individual wealth and so-
cial mobility appear to be strong determinants of voted redistribution, the theoretical
contributions of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole
(2006) have developed insightful models describing how individual beliefs can shape
politico-economic outcomes and viceversa and how multiple equilibria (US-type vs
Europe-type) are possible. These models with beliefs can explain how beliefs affect
redistribution and effort choices in static set-ups, but not how beliefs can affect inter-
generational inequality and mobility.9
In my model the amount of wealth left as bequest enter in the utility function of
the parents as in the models of Atkinson (1980) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
This is a convenient formalization which simplifies the dynamic problem to a great
extent because it implies that every generation only wants to maximize present wealth
and avoids issues of inter-temporal optimization and dynamic voting. The aim of this
paper is to build a dynamic model with bequests, stochastic skills, endogenous voting
and endogenous information. Stochastic skills are an important ingredient to study
mobility and to allow for incomplete information about the determinants of wealth but
imply some technical issues which will be discussed. Given such technical issues, it is
convenient to build the full model by steps, adding each building block separately. Af-
ter introducing the general set-up in section 2, section 3 analyzes the case of exogenous
political outcome and exogenous information, section 4 introduces voting but main-
tains exogenous information, section 5 allows for voting and endogenous information,
the last section draws some final remarks.
2 Set Up with Bequests
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of non-overlapping generations i ∈
[0,1]. Each generation (or agent) lives for one period t and is labeled by it . Each
generation it produces output yit with the following technology:
yit = θ it eit + kit−1, (1)
where kit−1 represents the bequest or other parental investment received by the previous
generation, eit is the effort implemented by generation it and θ it is the return to effort
or productivity. With respect to abilities, I consider both the case in which abilities
are i.i.d across different dynasties i but persistent over the life of a dynasty (θ it = θ i)
and the more interesting case that θ it is random and i.i.d. across i and t. As standard
in this literature, agents face the linear tax/redistribution scheme introduced by Romer
(1975). The individual budget constraint is given by
cit + kit = wit = (1− τt)yit + τt y¯t , (2)
where cit denotes own consumption, kit is the bequest left to the next generation, wit
denotes disposable wealth, τt is the tax rate, τt y¯t is the lump-sum transfer and y¯t is the
mean output in generation t. Each agent votes for the tax rate τt and exerts effort after
that the tax rate is announced. After that, individuals receive neat wealth according
to (2) and decide how much to consume or to leave as bequests out of it. The private
utility of each agent is given by the following function:
uit(c
i
t ,kit ,eit) =
1
(1−α)1−ααα (c
i
t)
1−α(kit)α −
bei2t
2
. (3)
The first term in (3) represents the utility from own consumption and bequests, whereas
the second term is the negative utility of exerting effort.
Following Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Atkinson (1980) I assume a Cobb-
Douglas function over consumption and bequests with α ∈ (0,1), which together with
the constant 1
(1−α)1−α αα implies that α ∈ (0,1) denotes the fraction of wealth allo-
cated to bequests, maintaining the dynamic problem very tractable. Agent it chooses
consumption, bequest and effort (cit ,kit ,eit ) so as to maximize utility subject to the bud-
get constraint, taking the political outcome (τt ) as given. It follows that the optimal
individual consumption and bequest are respectively
cit = (1−α)wit (4)
and
kit = αwit . (5)
The indirect utility function in terms of wealth thus reduces to
uit = w
i
t −
bei2t
2
. (6)
This set up allows to avoid inter-temporal optimization and problems of dynamic vot-
ing.
3 Step 1: Exogenous Tax Rate and Exogenous Information.
In this first version of the model I maintain two assumptions: (i) I abstract from voting
over τ considering this political outcome to be exogenously determined and constant
over time (τt = τ), (ii) I consider the case that each individual i is fully informed about
the value of θ i. This section shows results which are already known by the previous
literature but it is important for building the rest of the analysis.
Plugging the expression for pre-tax wealth (1) into the utility function (6) and
solving the f.o.c. I find the expression for the individual optimal effort:
eit = (1− τt)θ it /b. (7)
Plugging the expression for optimal effort (7) and the expression for pre-tax wealth (1)
into the individual budget constraint (2) I find the law of motion of bequests:
kit+1 = α
(
(1− τ)kit +(1− τ)2θ i
2
t /b+ τ ¯kt + τ(1− τ) ¯θ 2t /b
)
, (8)
which determines also the law of motion of wealth given (5). In the case in which
abilities are i.i.d. across different dynasties but constant over the life of a dynasty i
(θ it = θ i), the law of motion (8) describes a convergent auto-regressive process.10 It is
immediate to derive the steady-state bequest of dynasty i
ki = α((1− τ)
2θ i2/b+ τ(1− τ) ¯θ 2/b+ τ ¯k)
1−α(1− τ) (9)
and the steady-state mean (or aggregate) bequest
¯k = α(1− τ)
¯θ 2
b(1−α) . (10)
Not surprisingly, given that the only source of heterogeneity is in the abilities θ i, ex-
pression (9) shows that the greater is θ i and the greater is the steady-state wealth. It is
also obvious that redistribution has an equalizing effect. From (9) and (10) it can be
computed that the difference between mean and individual i bequest equals
¯k− ki = α(1− τ)
2( ¯θ 2−θ i2)
b(1−α(1− τ)) (11)
and decreases in the tax rate τ . At the same time expression (10) shows that redistribu-
tion diminishes aggregate bequest and hence aggregate wealth. This trade-off between
redistribution and growth is due to the fact that individual effort (7) decreases in the
tax rate and redistribution has no other effect on output11.
In order to have some more insights about the intergenerational dynamics of in-
equality and mobility it is interesting to explore the case that abilities are not persistent
over the life of a dynasty. Assuming that abilities are drawn at random for each genera-
tion t and that θ i2t = ¯θ 2+ε it , where ε it is an i.i.d. error term across i and t, with 0 mean,
variance equal to σ2 and zero serial correlation, the law of motion (8) still describes a
convergent auto-regressive process.12 The steady state mean bequest is still given by
expression (10) and the variance is equal to
var(ki) = α
2(1− τ)4σ2
b2(1−α2(1− τ)2) . (12)
As in the case with persistent abilities, increasing the rate of redistribution reduces
inequality across agents. 13
This model predicts convergency to a steady state value of wealth which does not
depend on the initial level of wealth. The version with persistent abilities is qualita-
tively very similar to the seminal model of Stiglitz (1969) which is widely known for
a Solow-type convergency in the context of individual wealth. Stiglitz (1969) model
shows that with a concave saving function – in this case bequest function – if abilities
are identical for everybody, everybody will converge to the same wealth, regardless of
the amount of initial wealth. With heterogenous abilities, inequality is driven by abili-
ties but once again initial wealth inequality does not matter in the long run.14 Plugging
the expression of optimal effort (7) and the expression of pre-tax wealth (1) into the
utility function (6) gives the expression for expected utility as a function of the tax rate
τ:
u¯ = y¯− c
¯e2
2
= ¯k+ (1− τ
2) ¯θ 2
2b . (13)
Expected utility is maximized by a zero tax rate. The reason is that the utility function
is linear in wealth and therefore there are no ex-ante gains from redistribution; on the
other hand effort and output decrease in the tax rate.
Case of Incomplete Information.
Leading to the analysis presented in the next sections, it is useful to analyze the case
in which agents have incomplete information and expect to be of average ability ¯θ . In
this case the expression for individual optimal effort is
eit = (1− τt) ¯θ/b. (14)
Plugging this expression and the expression for pre-tax wealth (1) into the individual
budget constraint (2) gives the law of motion of bequests:
kit+1 = α
(
(1− τ)kit +(1− τ)2( ¯θ )2/b+ τ ¯kt + τ(1− τ)( ¯θ)2/b
)
. (15)
The steady-state individual bequest, mean bequest and variance respectively follow:
ki = α((1− τ)
2
¯θθ i/b+ τ(1− τ)( ¯θ)2/b+ τ ¯k)
1−α(1− τ) , (16)
¯k = α(1− τ)(
¯θ )2
b(1−α) , (17)
var(k) = (1− τ)
4σ2
b2(1−α2(1− τ)2) . (18)
Given that ¯θ 2 > ( ¯θ )2, the mean wealth with complete information (10) is strictly
greater than the mean wealth under incomplete information (17).15 The same ben-
eficial effect of information appears by comparing the expression of expected utility
in the case of complete information (13) with the respective expression in the case of
incomplete information:
u¯ = ¯k+ (1− τ
2)( ¯θ )2
2b . (19)
From (16) and (17) it can be computed that under incomplete information the dif-
ference between mean and individual bequests equals
¯k− ki = α(1− τ)
2
¯θ ( ¯θ −θ i)
b(1−α(1− τ)) (20)
and decreases in the tax rate τ .
It is easy to notice that the steady state with incomplete information is character-
ized by lower inequality than the steady state with incomplete information, as the dif-
ference between expressions (11) and (20) is equal to α(1−τ)2(1−pi)(θH−θL)(piθH +
(1−pi)θL)b(1−α(1− τ)) which is a positive term given τ < 1.
4 Step 2: Endogenous Tax Rate and Exogenous Information.
The second step of the analysis is to introduce voting. Agents vote for the tax rate
before exerting effort; solving backward I find the objective function of voter it by
plugging the expression of optimal effort (7) and the expression for net wealth (2) into
the utility function (6) and then maximizing the obtained expression with respect to τ .
Each voter i maximizes the following indirect utility function in τ:
uit = τ(kit − ¯k)+ (1− τ)2θ i
2
/b+ τ(1− τ) ¯θ 2/b− (1− τ)2θ i2/2b. (21)
Assuming for the moment that the second derivative of expression (21) with respect
to τ is strictly negative, the first order condition gives the ideal tax rate of voter i:
τ it (kit ,θ i) = 1−
1+ b(k
i
t− ¯kt )
¯θ 2
2− θ i2
¯θ 2
. (22)
Both the numerator and the denominator of (22) show that the gains from redistribution
are traded off the moral hazard effect of taxation. I introduce the following assumption
in order to assure the concavity of the objective function (21) and therefore in order to
use the median voter theorem:
Assumption 1: 2θ 2L > θ 2H .
A proposition follows:
Proposition 1. The individual preferences for taxation are single-peaked and the in-
dividual ideal tax rate is given by expression (22).
Proof. The second derivative of the objective function (21) is given by the following
expression:
d2uit
dτ =
(θ i)2− 2 ¯θ 2
b .
The condition stated by assumption 1 is sufficient for (23) to be strictly negative as the
maximum value that (θ i)2 can take is θ 2H and the minimum value that 2 ¯θ 2 can take is
2θ 2L .
Proposition 1 shows that preferences over the tax rate are single peaked and there-
fore the median voter theorem applies. In order to analyze a steady state of the dy-
namic model, I look for a steady state such that given a stationary history τs = τ for
all generations s ≤ t− 1, then τt = τ is optimal for generation t.
Persistent Abilities across Generations
I first analyze the case in which abilities are persistent over dynasties, namely θ it = θ i.
Consider a stationary history τs = τ for all generations s≤ t−1. For each dynasty i the
low of motion (8) implies that the value of the bequest converges to expression (9) and
that the mean value converges to expression (10). Given persistent abilities (θ it = θ i)
and assuming that every dynasty starts life with no endowment (ki0 = 0 for all i), in
every period t the median and prevailing tax rate τt is that one of the dynasty with
median ability θ m. Plugging the expressions of the steady state median bequest km
(obtained through (9) ) and of the steady state mean bequest (10) into the expression
for the individual ideal tax rate (22) and using (11), I find the tax rate τt which follows
a given stationary history:
τt =
¯θ 2−θ m2 + α(1−τ)2( ¯θ 2−θ m
2
)
1−α(1−τ)
2 ¯θ 2−θ m2 . (23)
This expression is decreasing in τ , hence there is a unique fixed point.16 Redistribution
is driven by the difference between mean and median wealth and this is the case in
every period. The dynamic implication is that present redistribution depends on the
history of past redistributive outcomes and more precisely the tax rate declines over
time.17
Random Abilities across Generations
I now explore the case of random abilities. As I have done in the previous section with
exogenous voting I assume that abilities are drawn at random for each generation and
that θ i2t = ¯θ 2 + ε it , where ε it is i.i.d. across i and t with mean = 0 and variance equal
to σ2. Considering a stationary history τs = τ for all generations s ≤ t − 1, the law
of motion (8) implies that the mean bequest converges to expression (10) and that the
variance is equal to expression (12).
In general, it is complicated to identify the median voter at time t because this
depends on both the distributions of k and θ . To see this, take expression (22) and re-
express it as τ it (kit ,θ it ) =
¯θ 2−θ i2+b(kit− ¯kt )
2 ¯θ 2−θ i2 . This shows that the distribution of τ
i
t is given
by the ratio of two distributions, respectively the numerator and the denominator of
expression (22). Take for example the case in which ε it is normally distributed and each
generation starts with no endowment at time 0 (ki0 = 0 for all i). In this case both ki and
θ i are normally distributed at time t and the distribution of τ it (kit ,θ it ) =
¯θ 2−θ i2+b(kit− ¯kt )
2 ¯θ 2−θ i2 ,
is given by the ratio of two normal distributions. It is quite complicated to identify such
ratio distribution where the two normal variables have different means and to find the
median.18 This difficulty to deal with dynamic models of voting in which abilities
change over time has been recognized in the literature.19
Random Abilities across Generations and Incomplete Information
In order to skip this technical problem it is useful to consider the case of incomplete
information in which everyone expects to be of average ability ¯θ . In this case the
ideal tax rate of each individual i is given by expression (22) once that θ i2 and ¯θ 2 are
replaced by ( ¯θ )2, obtaining
τ i(ki, ¯θ ) = b(k
i
t − ¯kt)
( ¯θ )2
. (24)
Given that the distribution of the ideal tax rates only depends on the distribution of ki
it is immediate to identify the median voter to be the voter with median endowment
km. I consider two specific distributions as examples.
Example 1: binomial distribution of abilities. In every period each individual i
has ability θL with probability pi and ability θH with probability 1−pi and I assume
that every dynasty starts life with no endowment (ki0 = 0 for all i). Given a stationary
history, the distribution of k will converge to a normal distribution, because the distri-
bution of k comes from repeated independent Bernuolli trials over ability realizations
and the distribution of those realizations converges to a normal distribution. The fact
that the distribution of k converges to the normal implies that at time t the median and
the mean endowment coincide and therefore that τt = 0. Thus in the case of binomial
distribution of abilities there is a unique steady-state with zero tax. This is again a
case in which inequality progressively decreases. Being the steady state with zero tax,
there is convergency to the same steady state as in a model without redistribution. On
the other hand taxation may increase the speed of convergency.20
Example 2: Log-Normal distribution of abilities. I consider the case in which
θ i2t = ¯θ 2 + ε it , with ε it i.i.d for all i and t and log-normally distributed. I also assume
that in period 0 everyone starts life with no endowment, ki0 = 0 for all i. Given that
agents have incomplete information about θ i and believe to be of average ability ¯θ , a
stationary history is still specified by expressions (15), (17), (18) and k is log-normally
distributed in every period. Using the properties of the log-normal distribution, given
¯k and var(ki), the steady state median bequest is equal to km = ¯k2√
¯k2+var(ki)
. Given
such stationary history, the voted tax rate at time t is still given by τt = b(
¯k(τ)−km(τ))
¯θ 2 .
The difference ¯k− km decreases in τ , hence also in this case there is a unique fixed
point. Noticing that km decreases in var(ki), therefore the greater it is the underlying
inequality σ and the greater it is the steady state level of redistribution τ . I can solve
for τt = τ and characterize the steady state. Given that the distribution is skewed to the
right, the steady state level of redistribution can be different from zero, for example
the computations for the case of α = 0.2,b = 1, ¯θ 2 = 1,σ2 = 2 imply that τ = 0.17.
5 Step 3: Endogenous Tax Rate and Endogenous Information.
The previous section clarified the difficulties implied by the introduction of voting in a
model with heterogenous abilities. In this section I allow for varying levels of informa-
tion in the present dynamic model with bequests and I consider the level of information
as an endogenous variable in the economy. The main technical problem with varying
levels of information is still represented by the identification of the median voter. The
individual ideal tax rate is determined by the individual value of wealth and the ex-
pected ability. A steady state with endogenous information must have the feature that
the level of information is optimal. In order to check for this it is necessary to verify
that there are no gains in changing the level of information. This is difficult because
changing the level of information changes expectations, hence changes the distribu-
tion of ideal tax rates and such change is difficult to address. I provide a numerical
examples with multiple politico economic equilibria. In this example both complete
information (λ = 1) and minimum information (λ = 1/2) are optimal; the two equi-
libria have different macroeconomic features and can be interpreted as Europe-type
versus American-type equilibria.
5.1 Set-Up with Varying Information
Each generation it has ability θL with probability pi and ability θH with probability
1−pi , for all i and t. I maintain the assumption that pi > 1/2. In each period t each
agent i cannot observe her own or other agents’ productivity but only receives a private
signal σ it about the true value of θ it . Also the signal σ it is binary. If θ it = θL (θ it = θH ),
σ it takes values σL (σH) or σH (σL), respectively with probability λt and 1−λt . In
other words for each agent it the signal σ it is independently distributed, it is truthful
with probability λt , false with probability 1−λt and the transition matrix which takes
from the true productivity to the signal is the following:
T
([
σL
σH
]∣∣∣ [θL,θH ]
)
=
(
λt 1−λt
1−λt λt
)
. (25)
Agent’s i belief of the true value of θ it , conditional on the observation of the private
signal σ it , is obtained by the Bayes Rule. I introduce the following notation:
µ it ≡ Pr[θ it = θL|σ it ], (26)
represents agent it belief that θ it = θL conditional on the observation of signal σ it . From
the Bayes rule it follows that:
µtσL ≡ (µ
i
t |σL) =
piλt
piλt +(1−pi)(1−λt) (27)
and
µtσH ≡ (µ
i
t |σH) =
pi(1−λt)
pi(1−λt)+λt(1−pi) . (28)
The expected value of θ it conditional on the observation of σ it is given by the following
expression:
θ (µ it )≡ µ it θL +(1− µ it )θH . (29)
Given the symmetric structure of (25), I consider the interval λt ∈ [1/2,1], for all
t. For λt = 1/2 the signal σ it is completely uninformative and the posterior belief
is equal to the prior, i.e. µtσL =µtσH =pi . Increasing λt makes the signal progressively
more informative up to the point that λt = 1 and the signal is perfectly informative with
µtσL = 1, µtσH = 0. The value of λ represents the level of information in the economy
and in a rather abstract way I consider it is an institutional feature and a policy variable.
The ex-ante probability of observing σL for each generation alive at t is given by the
following expression:
pσLt ≡ Pr[σ it = σL] = λtpi +(1−λt)(1−pi), (30)
symmetrically
pσH t ≡ Pr[σ it = σH ] = λt(1−pi)+pi(1−λt) = 1− ptσL (31)
represents the probability of observing σH . Over-lined variables stand for mean values
for the population, hence y¯ and e¯ are respectively the mean, or aggregate, values of
output and effort and
θ ≡ piθL +(1−pi)θH,
θ 2 ≡ piθ 2L +(1−pi)θ 2H,
are respectively the mean values of productivity and squared productivity. The timing
of the model is such that each individual i who is alive at time t starts life receiving
a signal σ it and being aware of the level of precision λt . The game proceeds as in the
previous sections: agents vote on tax, exert effort, receive net wealth, consume and
leave bequests. The last action of the agents alive at t is to collectively decide the
level of information for the offspring, namely λt+1. I assume that the future level of
information λt+1 is determined by majority voting.
In the case in which abilities are random in each period t I would face the technical
difficulties implied by the determination of the median voter which I explained in
section 4. In order to keep the model tractable I restrict the analysis to the case of
persistent abilities and I assume that there are only two dynasties: the low ability
dynasty with ability θL in each period t and the high dynasty with ability θH in each
period t, respectively a fraction pi and 1−pi of the population. Nevertheless in the case
of incomplete information, agents do not learn about the persistence of abilities and
they “falsely”believe their prior: namely that in each period t abilities are i.i.d across
agents and agents are of type θL with probability pi and of type θH with probability
1−pi in each period t. On top of this prior, agents receive a signal about their ability,
which will give them perfect information only in the case of λ = 1.
5.2 Politico Economic Equilibrium with Perfect Information
Given a stationary history s ≤ t − 1 such that the voted tax rate is always τs = τ and
the voted information is always full information λs+1 = 1, I describe a steady state
such that at time t, the voted tax rate is still τt = τ and the voted information is still
λt+1 = 1. Given a stationary history τs = τ and λs+1 = 1 for s ≤ t − 1, at time t the
bequest for dynasty L (H) converges to the steady state value kL (kH ) given by (9)
and the mean bequest converges to the steady state value (10). Given the history with
persistent abilities and perfect information, at time t there are two groups of voters,
respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL,θL) and τ(kH ,θH) given by expression (22).
The prevailing tax rate at time t is τt = τ(kL,θL), because pi > 1/2 implies that the
majority of the population belongs to the dynasty with low ability and low endowment.
In a steady state it must be the case that τt = τ and that the bequest that agents with
endowments kL (kH ) leave for the t + 1 offsprings is still kL (kH ).
5.3 Politico Economic Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
Given a stationary history s ≤ t − 1 such that the voted tax rate is always τs = τ and
the voted level of information is always the minimum λs+1 = 1/2, I describe a steady
state such that at time t, the voted tax rate is still τt = τ and the voted information
is still λt+1 = 1/2. Given a stationary history τs = τ and λs+1 = 1/2 for s ≤ t − 1,
at time t the bequest for dynasty L (H) converges to the steady state value kL (kH )
given by (16) and the mean bequest converges to the steady state value (17). Given
the history with persistent abilities and perfect information, at time t there are two
groups of voters, respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL, ¯θ ) and τ(kH , ¯θ ) given by
expression (24). The prevailing tax rate at time t is τt = τ(kL, ¯θ ), because pi > 1/2
implies that the majority of the population belongs to the dynasty with low ability and
low endowment. In a steady state it must be the case that τt = τ and that the bequest
that agents with endowments kL (kH) leave for the t + 1 offsprings is still kL (kH).
5.4 Solution of the Individual Problem
In addition to leaving bequests, at time t agents decide by majority voting the future
information λt+1. Each agent it votes on λt+1 in order to maximize the utility of the
offspring it+1. In order to find the utility of an offspring as a function of λt+1 it is
necessary to solve backwards the choices of effort and voting of the agents alive at
t +1. Conditional on the signal, the expected utility that the generations who are alive
at time t maximize when they vote and exert effort is the following:
E[uit |σ it ] =
E[(1− τt)(kit + eitθ it )+ τt(¯kt + etθt )− b(eit)2/2|σ it ]. (32)
Solving the sufficient first order condition, the optimal level of effort exerted by indi-
vidual i is
eit = (1− τt)θ (µ it )/b. (33)
By backward induction, I can plug (33) into (32) and find the objective function that i
maximizes when voting for the tax rate. In order to do this, it is useful to specify the
individual i expectation of the output from effort:
E[eitθ it |σ it ] = (1− τt)(θ (µt))2 /b (34)
and of squared effort
E[(eit)2|σ it ] = (eit)2 =
(
1− τt
a
)2
θ (µt)2. (35)
In computing the mean (aggregate) product of effort eθ , each agent i knows that that
a fraction pi (1− pi) of the agents have productivity θL (θH ) and that among those
a fraction λ chooses the optimal effort after the observation of σL (σH ), whereas a
fraction 1−λ chooses the optimal effort after the observation of σH (σL). Therefore
the individual expectation of the aggregate output from effort is given by the following
expression:
E[etθt |σ it ] = (1− τt)Γ/b, (36)
where I define
Γ ≡ piθL (λ θ (µσL)+ (1−λ )θ (µσH))+
(1−pi)θH ((1−λ )θ (µσL)+λ θ (µσH )) . (37)
Collecting θ (µσL) and θ (µσH ) it is easy to re-write expression (37) as
Γ = pσL θ (µσL)2 +(1− pσL)θ (µσH )2. (38)
The term Γ is the expression for aggregate output from effort, net of the distortive
effect of redistribution on effort. Plugging (34), (35) and (37) into (32), I obtain an
indirect form of (32) as a function of τt :
uit(τt ,µ it ) = τt(kit − ¯kt)+ (1− τt)2θ (µ it )2/b+ τt(1− τt)Γ/b− (1− τt)2θ (µ it )2/2b.
(39)
This is the object that voter it maximizes voting over the tax rate τt . Assuming for
the moment that the second derivative of the obtained indirect utility in τ is strictly
negative, the first order condition gives the ideal tax rate of voter i:
τ(kit ,µ it ) = 1−
1+ b(k
i
t− ¯kt )
Γ
2− θ(µ it )2Γ
. (40)
The numerator of (40) shows that the gains from redistribution are traded off the dis-
tortive effect of redistribution and the denominator of (40) shows how the subjective
prospects of upward mobility reduce the desired tax rate.21
Proposition 2. The individual preferences for taxation are single peaked and the in-
dividual ideal tax rate is given by expression (40) .
Proof. The second derivative of the objective function in problem (39) is given by
the following expression: d
2ui1
dτ =
−2Γ+θ(µ)2
b . The condition stated by Assumption 1 is
sufficient for this expression to be strictly negative as the maximum value that θ (µ)2
can take is θ 2H and the minimum value that 2Γ can take is 2θ 2L .
Proposition 2 shows that preferences over the tax rate are single peaked and there-
fore the median voter theorem applies. Plugging (33) into (32) and taking expectations
conditional on the information at time t, I obtain generation it expectation of genera-
tion it+1 utility:
E it [u
i
t+1] = τt+1(¯k− ki)+ (1− (τt+1)2)Γt+1/2b. (41)
I model the collective choice of λt+1 as a choice by majority voting. Given that the
agents with kL are the majority, their choice of λt+1 will determine the prevailing
one. Therefore for a specific level of information λ ′ to be part of an equilibrium it
is necessary that λ ′ is the arg max {τt+1(¯k− kL) + (1− (τt+1)2)Γ/2b.} In order to
check for this it is necessary to know how τt+1 changes in λ . At time t + 1 there
are four groups of voters, respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL,θσL), τ(kH ,θσL),
τ(kL,θσH ), τ(kH ,θσH ). I claim that in this case of pi > 1/2 the prevailing tax rate under
majority voting is either τ(kL,θσL), or the greater between τ(kH ,θσL) and τ(kL,θσH ),
depending on the value of λ . This claim can be easily proved. The fraction of agents
who prefer τ(kL,θσL) is equal to pi pσL , where pσL is given by (30). When λ = 1
the fraction pi of agents with endowment kL knows to be of type θL. In the case in
which pi > 1/2, this implies that they are the majority group and impose their fa-
vorite tax rate. Decreasing λ implies that agents can have two types of beliefs, namely
θσL and θσH , and there are four group of voters, respectively with preferred tax rates
τ(kL,θσL), τ(kH ,θσL), τ(kL,θσH ), τ(kH ,θσH ). Decreasing λ implies that pi pσL de-
creases. There is a value λ ∗ ∈ (1/2,1) such that pi pσL = 1/2, namely λ ∗= −2pi+2pi
2+1
2pi(2pi−1) .
For λ ∈ [1/2,λ ∗) it happens that the group which prefers τ(kL,θσL) is not the major-
ity group, and the pivotal group will be either τ(kH ,θσL) or τ(kL,θσH ) depending on
which is the greater tax rate of the two. This is because in the case in which τ(kH ,θσL)
≥ τ(kL,θσH ), then it is the case that the total ranking of tax rates is τ(kL,θσL) >
τ(kH ,θσL) ≥ τ(kL,θσH ) and the fact that the fraction pσL of agents with belief θσL is
greater than 1/2 (this because pi > 1/2 and λ > 1/2) implies that the median voter
must belong to the group with τ(kH ,θσL). Otherwise in the case in which τ(kL,θσH )
≥ τ(kH ,θσL), it is the case that the total ranking of tax rates is τ(kL,θσL) > τ(kL,θσH )
≥ τ(kH ,θσL) and the fact that the fraction of agents with kL is greater than 1/2 (this be-
cause pi > 1/2) implies that the median voter must belong to the group with τ(kL,θσH ).
5.5 Example of Multiple Politico-Economic Equilibria
I consider the following numerical example: θL = 1,θH = 1.5,pi = 0.7,α = 0.2,b= 1.
I first consider the case of complete information λ = 1. Evaluating kL, ¯k and τt for the
given values and solving for τt = τ with I obtain that τ = 0.243. I plug this value back
into expressions (9) and (10) and I find the steady state values kL = 0.209 and ¯k = 0.26.
The majority of the agents at time t have endowment kL. Under majority voting, they
determine λt+1 in order to maximize the expected welfare of their offspring:
uL = τt+1(¯k− kL)+ (1− (τt+1)2)Γ/2. (42)
If pi pσL ≥ 1/2 then the prevailing tax rate at t + 1 is τ = τ(kL,θ (µσL)). Given pi =
0.7 and using the definition of pσLt+1 = piλt+1 + (1− pi)(1− λt+1), pi pσLt+1 ≥ 1/2
for λt+1 ≥ 1.03, therefore it is never the case that τ(kL,θ (µσL)) is the pivotal. The
prevailing tax rate is the greater one between τ(kL,θ (µσH )) and τ(kH ,θ (µσL)). I plot
both those two tax rates, respectively in figure 1 and 2.
Computations show that they equal each other for 0.584. Hence in the considered
interval τ(kL,µσH ) is greater and it is the prevailing tax rate. It is also important
to notice that τ(kL,µσH ) ≤ 0, for λ ≥ 0.55 and that τ(kH ,µσL) ≤ 0, for λ ≤ 0.63.
Therefore I consider τ = 0 in the interval λ ∈ [0.55,0.63]. I plot the objective function
(42) in figure 3, where τt+1 = τ(kL,µσH ) for λt+1 ∈ [0.5,0.55], τt+1 = 0 for λt+1 ∈
[0.55,0.63], τt+1 = τ(kH ,µσL) for λt+1 ∈ [0.63,1]. λt+1 = 1 is a global maximum.
I now consider the case of completely uninformative signals λ = 1/2. Given a sta-
tionary history s≤ t−1 such that the voted tax rate is τs = τ and the voted information
is the minimum information λs+1 = 1/2, I describe a steady state such that at time t,
the voted tax rate is still τt = τ and the voted information is still λt+1 = 1/2. Given a
stationary history τs = τ and λs+1 = 1/2 for s≤ t−1, at time t the bequest for dynasty
L (H) converges to the steady state value kL (kH ) given by (16) and the mean bequest
converges to the steady state value (17). Given the history with persistent abilities and
minimum information, at time t there are two groups of voters, respectively with pre-
ferred tax rates τ(kL, ¯θ ) and τ(kH , ¯θ ) given by expression (22). The prevailing tax rate
l
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Figure 1: τ(kL,µσH ) for pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
at time t is τt = τ(kL, ¯θ ), because pi > 1/2 implies that the majority of the population
belongs to the dynasty with low ability and low endowment. In a steady state it must
be the case that τt = τ and that the bequest that agents with endowments kL (kH) leave
for the t +1 offsprings is still kL (kH ). Following the previous example for λ = 1/2 to
be part of a steady state it is necessary that λ = 1/2 is the arg max expression (42).
I consider the same numerical example: θL = 1,θH = 1.5,pi = 0.7,α = 0.2,b = 1.
Evaluating kL, ¯k and τt for the given values and solving for τt = τ with Maple I obtain
τ = 0.03. I plug this value back into expressions (16) and (17) and I find the steady
state values kL = 0.28 and ¯k = 0.32. If pi pσLt+1 ≥ 1/2 then the prevailing tax rate
at t + 1 is τ = τ(kL,θ (µσL)). Given pi = 0.7 and using the definition of pσLt+1 =
piλt+1+(1−pi)(1−λt+1), pi pσLt+1 ≥ 1/2 for λt+1 ≥ 1.03, therefore it is never the case
that τ(kL,θ (µσL)) is the pivotal. The prevailing tax rate is the greater one between
τ(kL,θ (µσH )) and τ(kH ,θ (µσL)). I plot both those two tax rates for λ ∈ [1/2,1],
respectively in figure 4 and 5. They equal each other for 0.567, therefore the prevailing
tax rate is τ(kL,θ (µσH )) for λ ∈ [0.5,0.567] and τ(kH ,θ (µσL)) for λ ∈ [0.567,1].
Hence in the considered interval τ(kL,µH) prevails. It is also important to notice that
τ(kL,µH)≤ 0, for λ ≥ 0.551, and that τ(kH ,µL)≤ 0, for λ ≥ 0.6, therefore I consider
τ = 0 in the interval λ ∈ [0.567,0.6]. I plot the objective function (42) in figure 3,
where τt+1 = τ(kL,µH) for λt+1 ∈ [0.5,0.567], τt+1 = 0 for λt+1 ∈ [0.567,0.6], τt+1 =
l
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
K0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
tau (k_H , mu_L)
Figure 2: τ(kH ,µσL) for pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
τ(kH ,µL) for λt+1 ∈ [0.6,1]. λt+1 = 1/2 is a local maximum. 22 The two equilibria
can be further characterized in terms of the other endogenous outcomes.
Values of the Endogenous Variables in the Equilibrium with Perfect Information
Wealth of dynasty with low ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B): wBL =
kL +(1− τ)θ 2L = 0.965.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B): wBH =
kH +(1− τ)θ 2H = 2.080.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability after taxes: wL = (1− τ)(kL +(1− τ)θ 2L )+ τ(¯k+
(1− τ) ¯θ 2) = 1.047.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability after taxes: wH = (1−τ)(kH +(1−τ)θ 2H)+τ(¯k+
(1− τ) ¯θ 2) = 1.891.
Effort exerted by low ability individuals: eL = (1− τ)θL = 0.757.
Effort exerted by high ability individuals: eH = (1− τ)θH = 1.135.
Aggregate effort: e¯ = (1− τ) ¯θ = 0.870.
Aggregate output: y¯ = ¯k+(1− τ) ¯θ 2 = 1.300.
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Figure 3: Objective function (42) for pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
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Figure 4: τ(kL,µσH ) for pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
Values of the Endogenous Variables in the Equilibrium with Perfect Information
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Figure 5: τ(kH ,µσL) for pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B): wBL =
kL +(1− τ)θL ¯θ = 1.395.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B): wBH =
kH +(1− τ)θH ¯θ = 2.083.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability after taxes: wL = (1−τ)(kL +(1−τ)θL ¯θ )+τ(¯k+
(1− τ) ¯θ 2) = 1.401.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability after taxes: wH = (1− τ)(kH + (1− τ)θH ¯θ ) +
τ(¯k+(1− τ) ¯θ 2) = 2.069.
Effort exerted by both low and high ability individuals: eL = eH = e¯ = (1− τ) ¯θ =
1.115.
Aggregate output: y¯ = ¯k+(1− τ) ¯θ 2 = 1.603.
Interpretation of the Result of Multiple Equilibria
The numerical example shows the existence of two equilibria, respectively with com-
plete (λ = 1) and with minimum (λ = 1/2) information. In this numerical example
the multiplicity arises because λ = 1 happens to be a global maximum and λ = 1/2 is
a local maximum.23 In this numerical example, the non-monotonicity of the objective
function with respect to the level of information, which implies the possibility that
λ = 1/2 is a local maximum, is driven by the change in the identity of the median
Figure 6: Objective function (42) for pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
voter. In the interval in which the median voter is the group with preferred tax rate
τ(kL,µH) the tax rate decreases in λ . As figure 6 suggests, in this interval this effect
dominates the sign of the derivative of the objective function (42) and implies that in
such interval the objective function decreases.
6 Conclusion
This paper developed a dynamic model with bequests, stochastic skills, endogenous
voting and endogenous information. Given the technical issues involved, I proceeded
by steps adding one element at the time. The intermediate steps showed results already
known by the previous literature but offered a unified a framework. The result of the
paper is to have taken a first step towards the development of a unifying framework
which allows to study how beliefs about the determinants of wealth can affect the
dynamics of inequality, mobility and redistribution.
Given the technical difficulties that stochastic skills imply in the determination of
the median voter, I can only characterize equilibria with endogenous information for
the case of persistent abilities over the life of dynasties (θ it = θ i). In this case, with
a numerical example, I show the possibility of equilibria with complete (λ = 1) and
with minimum (λ = 1/2) information.
This example essentially shows that societies with similar fundamentals can find
optimal to be permanently “stuck”at different informative structures. Such different
informative structures imply different steady states in terms of beliefs, redistribution,
aggregate effort, aggregate output, separation of effort choices across individuals and
inequality of wealth across individuals. Why, in this example, does it happen that
a society remain stuck at a particular steady state? In terms of interpretations, the
equilibria of the example describe a society which is characterized by a certain level
of information long enough such that wealth is distributed so that for the majority
group there is no ex-ante gain in changing the information structure. This happens
because that particular level of information maximizes the welfare of the majority
group. Given that in the uninformative equilibrium of the numerical example λ = 1/2
is a local maximum, the interpretation of such equilibrium should be that of a society
for which the welfare gain in increasing the level of information would be off-set by
some implied structural costs of doing so. As explained at the end of the previous
section, it is important to notice that for this to be the case, a necessary condition is
that the welfare function does not increase monotonically in the level of information.24
The analysis of this paper does not generally show how the economic and redis-
tributive outcomes of an equilibrium depend on the level of information but it is limited
to numerical examples. The numerical examples show the possibility of equilibria with
complete (λ = 1) and with minimum (λ = 1/2) information. Comparing the endoge-
nous variables in the two equilibria of the example, the equilibrium with λ = 1 is char-
acterized by relatively higher redistribution, greater inequality before taxes, greater
inequality after taxes, more separated levels of effort, lower aggregate effort and lower
aggregate output. The informative (uninformative) equilibrium presents Europe-type
(US-type) features in terms of redistribution, aggregate effort and output. The feature
that the more informative equilibrium is characterized by higher inequality is not too
surprising given that in the example the uninformative equilibrium is characterized by
minimum information and levels of effort which are identical across different types of
agents. One would expect such pooling equilibrium to be associated with low inequal-
ity. In principle it does not have to be the case that more informative equilibria are
always associated with higher inequality. The opposite could happen if in the more
informative equilibrium the higher rate of redistribution distorts effort so much that
the levels of exerted effort are less separated, despite the fact that beliefs are more
separated. Interestingly enough given the mentioned empirical evidence about redis-
tribution and inequality, in such a case the driving force behind higher taxation would
not be the actual level of inequality, even though this would still impact on the ideal
tax rate, but the beliefs about the determinants of wealth. Moreover, in such a case,
the driving force behind the fact that effort levels are less separated in the Europe-type
equilibrium would be the distortive effect of taxation.25
In order to verify this possibility it is necessary to look for equilibria with interior
solutions in terms of information because the extreme cases do not seem to give that
result. Even in the case of persistent abilities, with interior solutions the identification
of the median voter is problematic. Allowing for the case in which abilities evolve
stochastically across generations could give interesting results about the study of mo-
bility and inequality, because it would be possible to characterize how different levels
of information impact on effort decisions and taxation and obtain interesting compar-
ative statics. Therefore, given the implied technical issues in the identification of the
median voter, it seems a promising direction for future research to investigate those
issues with numerical methods.
Notes
1Tommaso Gabrieli is Assistant Professor at Henley Business School, University of Reading. This paper
is a revised version of Chapter III of my Phd thesis, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Economics at the University of Warwick. I thank Herakles Polemarchakis and Sayantan Ghosal for
invaluable guidance and motivation as my PhD supervisors. Correspondence: School of Real Estate and
Planning, Whiteknights Campus, University of Reading, RG66UR, Reading, UK.
2More precisely, from incomplete to perfect information about the value of the return to effort versus the
role of luck or other predetermined factors.
3Students’ tracking (see for example Woessmann (2009)) or screening (see for example Bishop (1997)).
4See for example the discussion of Piketty (1995).
5See for example the discussion of Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
6A more extensive review can be found in Gabrieli (2009).
7See Piketty (1998) for an extensive review of the literature on bequests and intergenerational mobility.
8See for example Benabou (1996).
9The paper of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) contains a dynamic version of the main model. In this
dynamic version skills are fixed and permanently different across generations. For this reason the model
can show how beliefs can persist and societies can remain stuck in different equilibria as a result of different
initial conditions, but the model cannot give insights about mobility. Also the model of Piketty (1995) is
dynamic, but does not allow for intergenerational transfers. The dynamic aspect only concerns the learning
about the determinants of wealth. The model can give insights about the beliefs on mobility but not about
the actual mobility process.
10The process is convergent as the coefficient of kit is α(1− τ) < 1 and the rest of expression (8) is
constant.
11This is due to the linear production function and it is different from other models with concave produc-
tion functions, where redistribution can improve the efficiency of the inputs’ allocations and hence increase
output, see for example Galor and Zeira (1993) and Benabou (2000).
12In order to prove convergency, it is enough to cite the result of Hellwig (1980) which applies to Markov
processes of this type.
13It is easy to compute that expression (12) monotonically decreases in τ :
d(var(ki))/dτ = α2σ2b2
[−4(1−τ)3(1−α2(1−τ)2)−2α2(1−τ)5
(1−α2(1−τ)2)2
]
< 0, given τ < 1.
14A detailed analysis of the results of Stiglitz (1969) in the context of intergenerational transmission of
wealth is contained in the review of Piketty (1998). Piketty (1998) explains that, as shown by Bourguignon
(1981), in the case of convex bequest function the result about convergency does not generally hold. Other
causes that can imply non convergency are different fertility behaviours across households and credit market
imperfections. He also discusses the case of random abilities.
15 Information improves the efficiency of effort allocations and increases output, see Gabrieli (2010) for
a discussion.
16This result of a unique steady state is found also by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and it is the standard
result of Meltzer and Richard (1981) in a dynamic context.
17 The same result is also found by Bertocchi (2011) in a model which specifically analyzes the evolution
of bequest taxation over time.
18A technical analysis of the properties of this type of ratio distribution is done by Hinkley (1969).
19To my knowledge, the only analytical dynamic model of voting in which abilities change over time is
the one of Persson and Tabellini. (1991), but in this paper there is no identification of the median voter in a
steady state. In the published version of the paper (Persson and Tabellini (1994)) it is only considered the
case of persistent abilities. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Das and Ghate (2004), Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003), Saint-Paul (2001), Bertocchi (2007) only consider the case of persistent
abilities.
20Also this point has been discussed by Stiglitz (1969).
21The term θ (µ
i)2
Γ represents subjective prospects of upward mobility as it is equal to the the ratio of
individual output (34) over aggregate output (36), noticing that the term 1−τ
a
gets canceled out.
22Therefore with a linear cost of changing information C(λ ′ − 1/2) greater than the slope of the line
connecting the welfare function at λ = 1/2 and at λ = 1 it is an equilibrium, as shown in figure 6.
23Therefore for λ = 1/2 to be optimal it is necessary to introduce the additional assumption that there is
a cost of increasing the level of information which is large enough. It is worthy to mention that in the model
of Benabou and Tirole (2006) for multiple equilibria to exist the same assumption is necessary.
24More specifically, it is a case in which increasing information implies that the median voter sets a level
of taxation which is too high in terms of ex-ante aggregate welfare. See Gabrieli (2010) for a more extensive
discussion of this property.
25 This point seems to have some robust empirical support, see for example Prescott (2004).
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